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Abstract There is an increasing tendency in sensor 
networks (and related networked embedded systems) to 
push more complexity and ‘intelligence’ into end-nodes. 
This in turn leads to a growing need to support isolation 
between the software modules in a node. In conventional 
systems, isolation is achieved using standard memory 
management hardware; but this is not a cost-effective or 
energy-efficient solution for small, cheap embedded nodes. 
We therefore propose a software-based solution that 
promises isolation in a significantly lighter-weight manner 
than existing software-based mechanisms. This is achieved 
by frontloading effort into offline compilation phases and 
leaving only a small amount of work to be done at load 
time and run time.  
1. Introduction 
As sensor networks (and related networked embedded 
systems) evolve and grow in prominence there is an 
increasing tendency to push more complexity and 
‘intelligence’ into end-nodes. There are three main reasons 
for this. First, it enables more interesting applications that 
are not possible with simple data aggregation [15]. 
Second, sensor network architects are increasingly 
designing around the trade-off between processing and 
communication overheads (i.e. moving computation closer 
to data on the grounds that the energy cost of sending a 
byte over the radio is equivalent to thousands of processor 
cycles). Third, many sensor networks have inherently long 
deployment lifetimes, and this implies a need to 
restructure/update node software on an ongoing basis, and 
also to accommodate mutually-distrustful modules from 
multiple sources.  
As a consequence of the above trends, it is increasingly 
necessary to be able to preserve inter-module isolation on 
nodes in the face of faulty and untrustworthy code. 
Otherwise, for example, a faulty module could easily 
corrupt another module, or execute some functionality to 
which it had no right (e.g. reconfigure an I/O device). In 
traditional architectures such errors are prevented through 
hardware support for virtual memory and supervisor/ user 
modes: each module owns a private address space, and the 
hardware ensures that modules interact with the rest of the 
system in a controlled manner (e.g. through a system call 
interface). However, such hardware support is non-existent 
on many popular MCUs [7,16] in use in sensor networks. 
Furthermore, this situation seems unlikely to change in the 
foreseeable future due to the complexity and cost (in terms 
of both energy use and chip size) that these hardware 
mechanisms would introduce.  
In the past, researchers have developed a number of 
software-only solutions for inter-module isolation (e.g. 
[1,2,3]). These designs are superficially suitable for our 
purpose, but the fact that they have been designed with a 
completely different motivation in mind (i.e. to minimise 
the overhead of inter-module calls in traditional 
architectures) means that they have significant drawbacks 
when applied to our problem space. As discussed in detail 
in Section 4, these drawbacks include large binaries and 
high processing overheads that are not feasible on tiny 
embedded nodes. More recent examples of isolation-
related work specifically targeted at the sensor node 
domain are t-kernel [5], which takes its cue from [2]; and 
Maté [4], which is an application specific virtual machine. 
But again, as discussed in Section 4, these systems have 
significant drawbacks—e.g. t-kernel suffers from large 
code size, Maté suffers from programming language 
specificity, and both suffer from high run-time overhead. 
We therefore propose in this paper a software-only 
solution to the module isolation problem that attempts to 
overcome the problems of earlier work. In particular, our 
solution attempts to minimise memory and execution 
overheads at the sensor node by exploiting cheap CPU 
cycles at the pre-deployment stage while retaining a 
lightweight enforcement capability at the end-nodes. Our 
approach is also is programming language- and largely 
architecture-independent.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 describes our design, and Section 3 considers the 
costs and other implications of our design. Finally, Section 
4 compares our approach with related work and Section 5 
offers our conclusions. 
2. Design  
2.1 Assumptions and Constraints  
We assume that our target processors are RISC based 
MCUs with memory capacities in the order of kilobytes. 
We assume a generic RISC instruction set with a load-
store architecture and support for standard addressing 
modes (i.e. immediate, direct, indirect and indexed). In 
terms of constraints our design forbids self-extending or 
self-modifying code and imposes a fixed-size block-based 
memory management scheme. These constraints, which 
are motivated by the need for efficient isolation, should 
have little or no effect on most applications. 
2.2 Overall Architecture 
Our design employs the following four phase architecture:  
1. Compilation. Modules written in a high-level 
language are compiled to a virtual instruction set, 
which is close to a generic RISC instruction set 
architecture (ISA) but augmented with special  
‘emulated’ instructions for memory management and 
calling across protection domains.  
2. Transformation. VIS code is transformed offline to 
the target CPU’s native instruction set, except for the 
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‘emulated’ instructions. This process also produces a 
per-module ‘register partitioning policy’ (see below) 
which is shipped to the end-nodes along with the 
native code.  
3. Verification. A lightweight online verifier on the end-
node ensures that the code is ‘safe’ before allowing 
execution.  
4. Execution. Execution is dispatched to a small runtime 
environment when one of the emulated instructions is 
encountered. 
The key advantage of our design is that the verification 
and execution processes are simple enough to be practical 
for tiny embedded nodes; the more complicated processes 
are carried out at the pre-deployment stage. Furthermore, 
the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) is small and 
manageable as it comprises only the online verifier and the 
small runtime environment.  
The main concepts employed in our design are as follows. 
The scope of protection is called a domain, and each 
domain can hold a number of program modules and their 
associated data (including stacks). Both modules and their 
data are held in fixed-size blocks of memory. The virtual 
instruction set (VIS) provides instructions to create and 
destroy blocks and also to perform cross module and cross 
domain calls. When a block is created, the calling program 
receives a handle to the block. Memory within a block is 
then accessed either by specifying an indexed offset to the 
handle (i.e. indexed addressing) or through a non-
forgeable pointer that is derived from the handle (i.e. 
indirect addressing). The transformation phase derives a 
register partitioning policy which maps handles and 
pointers to designated registers on which only subset of 
addressing modes are allowed.  
Given the above concepts, the module isolation problem 
can be expressed as follows: 
1. Within a domain, we constrain loads/stores to be 
from/to blocks owned by that domain. 
2. Within a domain constrain, we control transfers to be 
to routines within that domain.  
3. Where cross-domain calls are involved, we constrain 
control transfer so that calls may enter routines only at 
their ‘official’ entry point1. This also applies to calls 
to the runtime environment. 
Next, we elaborate on VIS and each of the four phases. 
2.3 The Virtual Instruction Set  
The VIS is intended as a generic low-level intermediate 
language to which a range of high-level languages can be 
mapped. The bulk of the instruction set is close to a 
‘generic’ RISC ISA with the exception that an ‘infinite’ 
register set is available (this is motivated by our register 
partitioning approach described in Section 2.5) and that 
only the following addressing modes are used: immediate, 
direct (used mainly with control transfer instructions and 
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 Which functions a domain has access to is a matter of link-time access control 
and not is considered further in this paper.  
occasionally for memory mapped I/O), indirect (used with 
our special pointers) and indexed (used with handles).  
VIS’s ‘emulated’ instructions are as follows2: 
crtb reg  create a new data block and return 
a handle to it in reg 
crtp reg, offset  given a handle in reg and a numeric 
offset, create a new data pointer  
dsrt reg  destroy the data block whose handle 
is in reg  
ptoh src_r, dst_r    cast a pointer in src_r to its parent 
handle and place the latter in dst_r  
salloc reg s 
   
allocate a stack frame of size s and 
place a pointer to it in reg 
call target  
 
do an intra- or inter-domain call to 
the given target address         
ret return from function   
The crtb instruction creates a new block and returns a 
handle to it. As mentioned, handles are used for indexed 
addressing. Thus, given a handle H, the expression X(H) 
would form an address within the block referred to by H. 
Index X could range from 0 to the maximum block size. 
Given a handle, crtp can then be used to create a pointer to 
the block. This is simply a matter of performing a logical 
AND between the handle and the offset. This results in a 
pointer in which the high n bits refer to a block and the 
low m bits refer to an offset within the block. Pointers are 
used for indirect addressing and are safe in the sense that 
they cannot be made to point outside of their block. This is 
prevented by limiting the manipulation of pointers to the 
block offset bits. For example, in a deployment with 256 
byte blocks, only the last m=8 bits of the pointer can be 
manipulated. Within these limits, which are enforced by 
mechanisms to be described in Section 2.5, arbitrary 
arithmetic/logic operations can be applied to pointers. 
Each of the above instructions has the effect of placing the 
result (i.e. a handle or a pointer) in the specified virtual 
register. A pointer can be cast back to a handle using ptoh, 
and a block can be destroyed using dsrt. As well as 
handles and pointers to data, handles and pointers to code 
are also supported, as are handles to stack frames as 
discussed next. Stack frames are allocated using salloc 
which has the effect of placing a frame handle in the 
specified virtual register (which will later be mapped to 
the physical stack pointer register). Frame handles are 
similar to any other handle except that the indices have to 
be within the allocated frame (multiple stack frames within 
a block are supported). 
Finally, the call and ret instructions support both intra and 
inter domain calls. Other control transfers can be handled 
using native instructions. For example, direct jumps 
(where the target address is given in the instruction) or 
branches are allowed where they are within a module.  
2.4 Phase 1: Compilation  
Apart from its block based memory management, VIS in 
many respects similar to a modern compiler intermediate 
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 There are also instructions to create and destroy domains and to initialise 
domains with code blocks. However, these instructions are used only by the 
system loader/linker and are not considered further in this paper. 
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language [8] (i.e. with an infinite register file and generic 
RISC instruction set).  
Although blocks are explicit at the VIS level, they are not 
necessarily visible to the programmer. For example, 
different compilers could choose to make the blocks 
explicit to the programmer [9,10] or to automatically infer 
allocation [11]). Furthermore, since stack management is 
handled by the runtime most block allocation is 
transparent to the compiler. However language libraries 
for dynamic memory management can easily be adopted 
on top of the block based scheme. 
2.5 Phase 2: Transformation  
The transformation phase is responsible for translating 
VIS to a specific target RISC ISA. Its other main job is to 
map handles and pointers to dedicated physical registers 
according to the afore-mentioned register partitioning 
policy. This is defined as a partition of the available 
physical registers into 4 categories3: i) data handles, ii) 
code handles, iii) pointers, and iv) general purpose.  
A specific partitioning policy is selected for each module, 
the goal being to minimise register ‘spills’ in the context 
of the behaviour of the associated module4. For example, if 
a given module does not perform any dynamic memory 
allocation there is no need to dedicate any data handle 
registers. 
The determination of partitioning policies is done through 
offline code analysis (inter/intra procedural). There are 
various tradeoffs to consider. For example, we want to 
minimise handle/pointer spills because they are costly in 
terms of processing cycles (as the runtime is involved in 
loading these). This suggests a partitioning policy that 
allocates many registers to handles/pointers. But if this is 
done, the number of general purpose registers is reduced, 
and spills from these are costly in terms of both memory 
usage (i.e. additional stack space) and code size (i.e. 
additional loads and stores).  
Once a suitable partitioning policy is determined, register 
allocation and code generation can be performed. 
Depending on the target ISA, most VIS instructions 
translate one-to-one to the target ISA, except for the 
special ‘emulated’ instructions discussed in Section 2.3 
which are handled by the runtime environment. Calls to 
the runtime environment are realised as direct mode native 
calls to predefined entry points (see Section 2.7). Pointer 
manipulation instructions are mapped to native 
instructions that manipulate only the low m bytes of the 
pointer (see Section 2.2). In cases where m=8 (and 
therefore the block size in 256), this is easily achieved by 
using the target ISA’s byte instructions5. VIS’s call/ret 
instructions involve calling the runtime environment 
because a switch between code with different register 
partitioning policies requires initialisation (see Section 3). 
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 Because of this, the register partitioning policy can be represented very 
economically: e.g. for 16 registers, 1 byte is sufficient. 
4
 It is also possible to consider finer-grained register allocation policies such as 
per-function. 
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 In other cases, instructions that employ pointers would need to employ additional 
emulated instructions. We have so far only considered the case of m=8 and byte 
instructions. 
Finally, the code is statically partitioned into blocks 
(normally the same size as data blocks). To deal with 
possibly non-contiguous code blocks, direct branches 
within a module are converted to index mode branches 
through code handles. 
Thus, following the transformation phase, each module 
consists of number of code blocks and their associated 
register partitioning policy or policies.  
2.6 Phase 3: Verification  
When new code modules arrive at a node, static 
verification is performed on them before they are loaded 
for execution.  
Direct jumps/loads/stores are easy to check as the 
addresses are literals embedded in the instruction. So it is 
only necessary to check that the target address is within 
the relevant block (or, e.g., within a permitted memory 
mapped I/O vector).  
Indexed and indirect mode loads/stores/branches are 
verified using the attached register partitioning policy. 
There are two aspects to this. First, the verifier ensures that 
the dedicated registers are used correctly; for example, that 
arbitrary data is not loaded into handle or pointer registers, 
or that there are no memory accesses or branches through 
general purpose registers. Second, the verifier examines all 
instances of indirect and indexed addressing modes. 
Indirect mode instances are verified by first making sure 
that only the low m bits of pointers (i.e. those bits referring 
to offsets within a block) are ever modified by application 
code (e.g. by byte instructions in the case of 256 byte 
blocks; see Section 2.5). Since initialising a pointer is 
handled by the runtime (i.e. the high bits point at the block 
from whose handle the pointer was derived), the pointer 
will always point within the designated block. Code and 
data pointers are treated differently: no branches are 
allowed using data pointers, and no stores are allowed 
using function pointers (to disallow self 
modifying/extending code).  
Indexed mode loads and stores are verified by checking 
that indexing is carried out through a dedicated handle 
register, and that all the indices (which are by definition 
embedded in instructions) are within the fixed block size. 
As the runtime environment guarantees that a loaded 
handle is necessarily correct, all indexing operations will 
therefore necessarily be within the block. Similarly, 
indexed operations through a frame handle are verified to 
be within the allocated frame (cf. the s argument to salloc).  
Branches/calls within a module are not problematic as the 
register allocation policy is the same throughout a module. 
However, when control is transferred between two 
modules with different partitioning policies, then the 
dedicated registers need to be reset to ensure correct 
isolation. There are two cases. If the two modules are 
within the same domain, only registers whose usage 
changes from general purpose to dedicated need to be 
reset. Otherwise, for cross-domain calls all dedicated 
registers need to be reset (this is done by the runtime 
environment within the emulated call instruction).  
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Note finally that the integrity of the system does not rely 
on the correctness of the partitioning policy: if accidental 
or malicious manipulation of a policy makes it inconsistent 
with the associated code, the latter will simply be rejected 
(or if the manipulated policy is still consistent with the 
code then execution will anyway be confined to the 
respective domain). Therefore, we do not rely on 
cryptographic primitives to ensure code integrity.  
2.7 Phase 4: Execution  
The task of the runtime environment is to execute the 
emulated instructions specified in Section 2.3. It also 
implements the following additional routines to deal with 
handle and pointer register spills (calls to these are 
inserted by the transformation phase using native call 
instructions): 
loadh reg_id, handle_id  load a handle 
loadp reg_id, pointer_id   load a pointer  
storep reg_id, pointer_id  store a pointer  
The loading of a handle/pointer involves searching for the 
id in a list maintained by the runtime environment, and 
then loading the handle/pointer into the specified register.  
The runtime also handles stack management through 
salloc. Stacks reside in—possibly non-contagious—
block(s), and if a stack frame cannot fit within an existing 
block allocated for the stack, it will be allocated in a new 
block. The emulated ret instruction resets the frame 
handle.  
There is a key issue around the calling of these runtime 
environment routines. In particular, it is necessary to 
ensure that the verifier can validate critical arguments 
passed to these routines (in particular, it is crucial to 
validate the reg_id argument to the above functions and 
the target argument to call). However, if we were to 
simply pass the arguments on the stack, there would be 
nothing to prevent code elsewhere from pushing some 
malicious arguments onto the stack and then jumping to a 
runtime environment entry point. The verifier could not 
detect such a loophole. To prevent this we must explicitly 
associate each call with its associated argument in such a 
way that the binding between the two can be verified 
statically. To achieve this, the transformation phase 
embeds the arguments in the word(s) immediately 
following the call instruction (this is feasible because the 
critical arguments are known at compile time. Since the 
native ‘call’ instruction is assumed to automatically push 
the PC on the stack, the runtime routine can then reliably 
access the arguments to which the PC is pointing (and then 
increment the PC to the next instruction within the 
routine). This, together with the fact that code is not re-
writable, forms a reliable basis on which the verifier can 
treat the call and its arguments as one indivisible unit. 
The above-described mechanisms, together with the action 
of the verifier, are sufficient to secure the required 
isolation semantics as set out at the end of Section 2.2. 
3. Design implications and costs 
Our design is currently under implementation and is not 
yet sufficiently mature for a comprehensive performance 
evaluation. In the meantime, we briefly analyse the 
overhead implications of the design. We focus on runtime 
overheads and ignore the offline costs of compilation and 
transformation: these latter rely on well understood 
compilation principles and are anyway not time critical. 
Runtime overheads comprise verifier and execution 
environment overheads. Verifier overheads are limited to 
making a single pass over the code, carrying out pattern 
matching to detect relevant instructions (i.e. those 
involving direct, indirect and indexed addressing) and 
checking them against the register allocation policy as 
described in Section 2.6. This involves a small and fixed 
per-instruction overhead which is well within the 
capabilities of an embedded node. 
In terms of execution overheads, the main factors are the 
cost of VIS instruction emulation and the effects of the 
register partitioning policy (in terms of spillage). The 
emulated instructions with the highest overheads are load, 
crtp and call. The former two instructions save two 
registers, locate handle_id in a list, and determine reg_id 
from the code block. Crtp additionally involves a logical 
AND of index and handle_id. The cost of these steps on an 
MSP430 MCU is corresponds to ~20 instructions 
assuming a list of 5 handles. The overhead for call 
involves inspecting the stack pointer to ensure that there is 
enough room for another call before current call returns. In 
addition, all cross-module calls need to zero the handle 
and pointer registers to ensure isolation. Again, these 
operations involve only modest overhead. 
The effects of the register partitioning policy are less easy 
to quantify as they are heavily dependent on peculiarities 
of a particular piece of code. The selection and evaluation 
of an optimal register algorithm remains an area for future 
work. 
There are a number of other smaller sources of overhead: 
in particular, there is a degree of memory wastage due to 
internal fragmentation caused by the use of fixed-sized 
blocks and there will be a small increase in executable size 
due to dealing with dedicated register spillage. Note, 
however, that this memory overhead is likely to be tiny in 
comparison to other systems (see Section 4). 
Finally, as most VIS instructions map directly to native 
equivalents, most code executes natively without any 
execution overhead whatsoever. Memory access incurs no 
additional cost as all the verification has been carried out 
prior to execution, and native instructions/ addressing 
modes are used.  
4. Related work 
As mentioned in the introduction, enforcing module 
boundaries in a single address space has been extensively 
studied in traditional architectures. For example, Software 
Fault Isolation [2] achieves isolation by binary code 
rewriting: first the code is statically checked to ensure that 
all direct jumps are within the monolithic code segment 
assigned to the module; then dynamic checks are inserted 
into the code at each indirect jump and store to ensure that 
these are also ‘safe’. Unfortunately, in sensor nodes with 
little memory, allocating continuous regions for each 
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module is not practical. Also, fully-general reliable binary 
rewriting is a complex task that is not practical on tiny 
embedded nodes. Furthermore, facilitating offline-
rewriting would require an underlying cryptographic 
infrastructure (i.e. to enable the embedded node to verify 
the integrity of the rewritten code). This would carry 
undesirable overhead for embedded systems environments. 
Actually, our design can be considered as a generalised 
form of SFI. However there are 4 major differences: i) no 
binary rewriting at the target node is necessary 
(conceptually, this is moved to the transformation phase); 
ii) our scheme allows multiple blocks of code and data in 
each domain (allocating single monolithic areas is 
infeasible on small embedded nodes); iii) because of the 
use of fixed sized blocks we eliminate most of the 
dynamic checks required in a SFI system; and iv) our use 
of dedicated registers is different: while the classic SFI 
scheme requires 3 dedicated registers (segment start, 
length (shift), formed address) for forming an address 
within a block, we need only a single register, the one that 
actually contains the formed address. This reduced register 
overhead is particularly important for MCUs with small 
register files.  
T-kernel [5] is a good example of other work on adapting 
the SFI approach to the sensor network domain. However, 
t-kernel introduces large code size overheads (on average a 
factor of 8) due to the extensive rewriting employed. Also, 
t-kernel incurs high runtime overhead—for example, heap 
access can take 180,857 cycles. Execution cost in our 
scheme is minimal because memory accesses are mapped 
to native instructions, and handle loads/pointer-
initialisations cost only around 20 instructions. 
Proof Carrying Code [3] achieves isolation by requiring 
the construction of a ‘proof’ which verifies the software’s 
compliance with the target host’s ‘safety policy’. This 
approach is superficially attractive for the sensor node 
context as the complex task of proof-generation is done 
offline, and the node performs only a ‘simple’ validation. 
Unfortunately, proofs tend to be much larger than the code 
itself (up to 8 times the code size [3]), and validating the 
proof, written using the Edinburgh Logic Framework (LF), 
is again a task that is beyond tiny embedded nodes.  
SPIN [1] approaches the issue of isolation by leveraging 
high-level language semantics. However, there is an 
explosion of different languages and programming 
paradigms in use in the network embedded systems field 
(e.g. declarative, agent-based [13], global-programming 
[12]) and mandating a single type-safe language such as 
Modula, or even small set of such languages is therefore 
infeasible or at least undesirable. Also, code for embedded 
devices is often written in type-unsafe languages such as 
C, and hand-tuned assembler code is still common in the 
field. Furthermore, the same requirement for a 
cryptographic infrastructure that we noted above for SFI 
would equally apply to language based approaches. 
Another approach to implementing modularity and 
protection is through high-level application specific virtual 
machines, such as Maté [4]. But the cost of full 
interpretation as used in such designs is costly and soon 
becomes a limiting factor for computationally intensive 
applications (e.g., Maté’s emulated add instruction costs a 
few hundred cycles).  
5. Conclusions  
Module isolation in embedded nodes is an increasingly 
important issue. We have described a language, and 
largely architecture-independent, solution that attempts to 
move most of the overhead of enforcing isolation to a pre-
deployment stage, while retaining a minimal but sufficient 
enforcement mechanism at the end-nodes.  
Essentially, our approach employs the notion of dedicated 
registers coupled with per-module register allocation 
policies to restrict addressing modes in such a way that all 
instructions can be verified prior to runtime to access only 
fixed ranges of addresses (i.e. within blocks). Apart from 
this sandboxing, normal addressing semantics are 
maintained and, furthermore, considerable flexibility is 
maintained at runtime—i.e. dynamic code loading, 
memory allocation and block relocation are all supported. 
Currently, we are completing our implementation and are 
also writing a formal model of the design. Beyond that, the 
issue of determining optimal register allocation policies 
based on code analysis is a key area for further 
investigation. This will build on existing compiler 
technology (which of course already needs to 
appropriately allocate registers to minimise spillage) but 
will need to be refined to work at the finer granularity of 
our 4 register categories. 
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